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In view of a renewed interest in notationality as central concept in design theory, the
aim of this paper is to rethink of the concept of notationality as developed by Nelson
Goodman in order to conceptualize the link between notational practices and their
role as epistemic procedures in architectural design in a way that is tailored to the
discipline. In-between the radical ambiguity of early sketches and the determined,
anatomical character of the final drawings of an architectural design process exists a
conceptual twilight zone in which various types of visuals overlap and interact, and in
which the practice of drawing plays a pivotal, developmental role. The epistemic
potentials of these practices are dependent on purposive notation. We develop two
concise themes here: first, the relation between notation, iterability and signs;
second, notation and the experimental ‘space of formalization’ it provides.
architectural drawing; notationality; design process; inscription

1

Introduction

The traces and marks left by pencils and styluses (and more recently on computer screens) play
instrumental, operative roles in architectural design processes. Drawing serves to develop
architectural ideas, forming an indispensable part of architectural thinking processes (Edwards 2008,
pp. 12–13; Geer 2011, p. 45; Pallasmaa 2015, p. 92).
Some forms of drawing are forms of notating that exhibits potentials as cornerstones of designbased thinking. Their potential is inextricably bound to notating. Their usage as design tool for
developing ideas cannot be decoupled from the fact that it is a practice of materializing thoughts
through the practice of purposive notation, of inscribing traces on a surface in a directed, cognitive
process that is intrinsically entangled with its object (Schurk 2013, p. 538; Van Den Berghe 2013, p.
667).
Given this reliance on notation, the aim of this paper will be an attempt to rethink of the concept of
notationality as developed by Goodman (Goodman 1968) in order to conceptualize the link between
notating and its role in knowledge production in architectural drawing in a way that is tailored to the
discipline. This seems necessary in view of two developments. First, a renewed interest in
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-Share Alike
4.0 International License.
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/

notationality in conjunction with the idea of operativity in design processes. (Ammon 2013, Krämer
2009) Second, because Goodman had many worthwhile things to say about notational practices, yet
left the topic of notation in architectural design processes largely undeveloped.
By explicating how Goodman conceived the relation between idea and notation, followed by a
proposal to rethink the concept of notationality in a new direction, the case is made that
architectural design is a form of thinking that is closely bound to notational practices, yet in a
broader sense than Goodman imagined. Moreover, the case is made that Goodman overlooked
precisely those aspects that make notationality important for contemporary architectural practices.
This claim is substantiated by a recourse to works by Zumthor (2014), De Certeau (1988) and Krämer
(2009).

2

Notationality: the relation of idea to notation

The concept of notationality as discussed here derives from the aesthetic theory of Nelson
Goodman. (Goodman 1968, pp. 127–156) Informally, the term refers to the degree to which artistic
performances can be noted down in a notational scheme with a high degree of exactitude. Thus, a
score of a Bach cantata or the written choreography of a dance is notational: it can be expressed on
paper and read afterwards; it can be performed multiple times by referring to the written sequence
of signs. Each time the cantata or dance is performed is an instantiation of the score or
choreography.
Put differently, the score or choreography is a type that determines which performances are tokens
of the instructions set down in writing. A performance that misses essential features cannot be said
to be that specific cantata or this specific dance. (Miller 2017) The score thus determines how we
should judge the performance – if the gap between instruction and instantiation becomes too wide,
the relationship between the two is obliterated. Originally, Goodman introduced the concept of
notationality to distinguish between autographic and allographic works of art, shifting the emphasis
of the discussion towards the relation between the type (the original) and the token (its
performance or instantiation) (D’Cruz and Magnus 2014, pp. 2–4).
More formally, the term notationality is a stringent condition for symbol systems or schemes. The
aim of this condition is to specify precisely how a notational scheme or system might be translated
to a performance and back. (Goel 1991) Thus, a set of symbols that possesses perfect notationality
can be used as basis for a performance (for example, as a cantata). Conversely, the performance can
be used for writing a series of symbols that allows for a second, qualitatively identical performance.
Goodman applied this distinction to architectural design, leading to the question to what degree
drawings or sketches could be understood as a token of an original thought.
Goodman held that notationality applied not only to performances that can be readily described by
notational schemes or systems, such as scores or choreographies, but that it also could apply to
sketches and paintings. Of course, he remarked that sketches are different and less defined than
musical scores:
Thus, whereas a true score picks out a class of performances that are the equal and only
instances of a musical work, a sketch does not determine a class of objects that are the
equal and only instances of a work of painting. Unlike the score, the sketch does not
define a work (…) but rather is one (Goodman 1968, p. 193).
This discussion of the sketch is closely aligned with Goodman’s discussion of painting, where the
same problem surfaces: the musical score or the choreography is an ideal example, and is expressed
in a clear, symbolic language. Although the score does not determine everything about the
performance (its expressiveness, for example, is more hinted at than completely described), its
formal appearance and the use of individual symbols is unambiguous. Notes are notes, and steps are
steps in these ideal languages. Visual language is in this sense more complex: it does not consist of
discrete units (like notes, letters or symbols), and while Goodman discusses how one may consider a
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painting as a class on its own, the original problem remains: there is a fundamental ambiguity
regarding the notation and the work in painting.
The problem is one of identity: the painting does not refer to a prior score or script, and each
attempt to remake it does not rest on the interpretation of a symbolic language, but on a direct
performance. One has to paint to replicate a painting, while someone does not have to compose in
order to re-perform a cantata.
When we consider sketches in the context of an architectural design process, the problem
introduced by Goodman deepens. First, many sketches are not clear, unambiguous instructions in a
predefined visual language. Second, there is no formal condition that states that a visual language is
structurally akin to a verbal language. Third, architectural design processes are comprised of multiple
visual languages superimposed on each other. Quick scribbles and thoughts that are jotted down
may be a-temporal, even a-spatial ideas (Graves 1977). They are ambiguous in character, making it
hard to consider them as a score, script or choreography.
Conversely, the contents of a technical drawing are fully determined. It is composed of technical,
symbolic languages to clearly and unambiguously communicate its meaning. Dimensions, materials,
and symbols play utilitarian, practical roles in such drawings. On the level of notation, technical
drawings used to realize architectural objects have more in common with a script or a musical score
than the conceptual drawings early in the design process:
In that architecture has a reasonably appropriate notational system and that some of its
works are unmistakably allographic, the art is allographic. But insofar as its notational
language has not acquire full authority to divorce identity of work in all cases from
particular production, architecture is a mixed and transitional case (Goodman 1968, p.
221).
It is here that Goodman skips a step here as it were, leaving the variety and different roles of
architectural drawings largely undiscussed, calling architecture broadly ‘mixed and transitional’,
while abstaining from clarifying how different media, notational systems and performance are
distributed in architectural design processes. Exactly this gap in Goodman’s provides an opportunity
to reflect on the role of notations in architectural representations, and to augment them to suit
architectural practice.
In-between the radical ambiguity of early sketches and the determined, anatomical character of the
final drawings of an architectural design process exists a conceptual twilight zone in which various
types of visuals overlap and interact, and in which the practice of drawing plays a pivotal,
developmental role. In a sense then, architectural drawing is a form of notation, but it is a vastly
different form than the script or the musical score. Instead, in architectural design processes
different forms of notation come together and overlap.
The question that Goodman poses (‘is a work repeatable by relying on its notation?’) is thus not
directly applicable (or even relevant) to architectural practice. Instead, the drawing is an integral
part of the creative process that gives rise to realized architecture. Although it is possible to build
the same building twice, it does not follow that therefore every architectural drawing is a kind of
musical score to which Goodman’s criteria of notationality must apply, nor is it the case that an
autographic work should be a one-off affair. Instead, the situation is often the other way around:
drawings deal with a specific context and a specific architectural assignment that cannot be divorced
from the final, built result (D’Cruz and Magnus 2014, pp. 10–11).
To do justice to architectural drawings the relation between the notation and the built (or even
unbuilt) result needs a different account in order to be applicable to architectural design processes.
Two main reasons can be noted for this necessity; first, architectural drawings, models and artefacts
are not only intended as instructions for realization. Second, they contain a multitude of insights that
are not reducible to linguistic structures, and cannot be judged solely as series of symbols – although
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such symbols form much of the content of the drawing. If Goodman’s account should be criticized
on fundamentals, his reliance on symbol systems and their semantic and syntactic properties to
clarify processes in domains where these properties have limited applicability should be considered
as a prime candidate. The linguistic model works well for certain symbol sets and applications (for
example, mathematical symbols or the alphabet), but only limited in the case of drawings and
images in a broader sense. It is at this point that we may need to leave Goodman’s approach behind,
and look for different ways to augment his argumentation with regards to images and drawings.
Therefore, the next section discusses how the notational systems are utilized during architectural
design processes in ways that are indeed notational, yet of a broader character not entirely
reducible to Goodman’s model. In turn, the epistemic potentials of such systems are dependent on
such purposive notation. We develop two concise themes here: first, the relation between notation,
iterability and signs; second, notation and the experimental space it provides. These themes allow us
to augment and complement the useful features of Goodman’s account with selected concepts to
make the concept of notationality relevant to contemporary architectural practice.

3

Notation, iterability and signs

When one draws to design something, either a building, neighbourhood or logo, one is confronted
with absence: the object under construction exists only as a promise, as a vague mental image
maybe. Although it is absent in its physical form, it structures the inquiry. The absence of the object
is not just a simple lacking, a generic non-presence. It is an absence of a specific type:
Since every absence, whether in the language of action or in articulated language (…)
presupposes a certain absence (to be determined), the absence within the particular
field of writing will have to be of an original type if one intends to grant any specificity
whatsoever to the written sign (Derrida 1988, p. 7).
Derrida’s claim here is very precise: the signs and traces that emerge as reaction to an absence
match it, like a puzzle piece that matches an empty slot. If we apply this thought to architectural
design, the drawing process is not just a matter of imitation, of denoting a mental image, but it is a
precise response to a precise absence. The first conclusion to be drawn here is that denotation is not
the goal of a representative process: the idea is explicitly not to create images that resemble a
ready-made ‘image in the head’. Instead, the precise absence forces designers to respond in ways
that are clearly matched and oriented towards the subject matter.
Drawing is a way to represent various qualities and properties of the absent object, hauling it step by
step into the physical world. While it is certainly true that architectural drawings can be used to
‘test’ or ‘refine’ the properties of the object in the real world, such an account would be overtly
reductive. (Edwards 2008, pp. 12–13) Drawing is as much constitutive as it is explicatory. It
materializes an idea, instead of merely externalizing a ready-made mental version of it. (Dernie
2013, p. 10) Here, then, is a first reason to regard drawing as an explicit notational form of thinking –
the developmental potential of architectural thinking is embodied in its drawing practices.
Architectural objects are materialized through notation (or, alternatively, inscription or tracing). In
design processes, such acts of notation manifest through drawing or modelling. The qualities that
are being drawn or the objects that are being modelled do not pre-exist somewhere, waiting to be
released. Instead, their qualities have to be uncovered and created at the same time. This process
rests on a very specific type of repetition that works through notation. Sketches and ideas are
reworked over and over again, re-iterating a concept, thought or idea.
An example of this practice can be found in the work of UNStudio. Van Berkel and Bos utilized
diagrams that described the structure of design proposals on a very general level. These diagrams
condense information in an organized, yet flexible manner. Van Berkel and Bos note that even
before thinking of practicalities, the diagram shows what is happening at a certain location. (Van
Berkel & Bos 2006, p. 15)
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Since every architectural project is embedded in its own, singular context, UNStudio developed
customized diagrams that were tailored to the needs of individual projects. They noted that after a
few years, certain diagrams re-appeared, and that this repetition led to a more precise and focused
level of inventiveness. This type of repetition is different from just replicating the same solution in a
different situation. Each repetition is simultaneously a further developmental stage of an existing
knowledge base and a new adaptation to a unique architectural context.

Figure 1 UNStudio diagram; each phase highlights an individual design decision, limiting what is depicted in each step.
Source: UNStudio

Diagrams unite serial production and combinatorial freedom. Each diagram is uniquely tailored, yet
linked to its predecessor and to its descendant. Yet, by combining and recombining elements in the
diagrams, something genuinely new emerges through re-iterating a similar methodological gesture.
The concept of iteration is closely related to the theme of re-performing: iterability connects
repetition to alterity, and similarity to novelty. (Derrida 1988, p. 7) Every form of notation has this
potential to some degree. Both in reading and writing, generative repetition occurs. Every time a
sign is written or a drawing is made, something genuinely new emerges. Such repetition is needed to
reach alterity at all. It is the necessary condition for emerging novelty. Naturally, this introduces the
question why this should be so.
First, we should therefore note that the repetition we encounter here is not necessarily the same as
in the case of performing the same cantata or dance twice – the performance is not a token of an
ideal type. (Parsons 2016, p. 16) The repetition in architectural design processes is of a different
character. The reason of why this is possible may be sought in the signs it utilizes, and the role that
these signs play in the thinking process.
The individual signs that constitute drawings are peculiar elements in the sense that they combine
seemingly paradoxical and contradictory qualities. They are highly abstract, depicting the bare
minimum of an idea, sometimes only alluding to some of its qualities. The sketches of Frank Gehry
come to mind – a few lines depict a general compositional principle, the details of which are not
directly derivable from the drawing itself.
Yet, these lines catch an architectural essence with minimal means – they serve as a point of
reference for reasoning and further development during subsequent design steps. A different form
of abstracting can be found in Ludwig Hilberseimer’s 1927 plans for a Großstadtarchitektur, his 1944
proposals for a ‘New City’, or O. M. Ungers’ 1977 Die Stadt in der Stadt, although in this case it is an
abstraction with regards to level of detail, not so much with regards to spatial composition in the
narrow sense. (Anderson 2016; Hilberseimer 1944; Ungers 1977) The organization and spatial

1478

configuration is there, but it lacks an element of how it functions in everyday life. Yet, these images
evoke a feeling of ‘indeed, it could work like this’, adding plausibility to a possible future, what De
Jong calls the creation of ‘necessary conditions for existence’. (De Jong 1992, p. 10)

Figure 2 Abstraction in the representation of a planned settlement. Some elements are worked out in detail, while other are
left open. Source: Hilberseimer 1944

Put differently, architectural drawings combine the formal and symbolic qualities of notational
systems with the allusive power of artistic expression. Nevertheless, the lines, shapes and planes of
architectural drawings have an abstractive quality much like musical scores.
This abstractive quality allows one to understand the architectural object as an object with a certain
agency – i.e. the capacity to actively guide and direct thinking processes. There is a certain holistic
quality to early process sketches that is only accessible, it seems, by a lack of presence: in such
sketches, many qualities of architectural objects are hinted at or suggested, but not spelled out. Yet,
they are strangely enough also present, drawing the observer into the drawing, encouraging him to
form associations in his mind. Again, the concept of iterability surfaces, although not in a strictly
linguistic form. It is as if drawings encourage a mental, generative iterability with regards to their
contents. In a precise analysis from Emma Cocker, this iterability can be seen at work as a critical and
creative faculty:
(…) the hypothesis emerges as autonomous critical activity, no longer bound by the
repetitious cycles of testing and validation to which is it subjected in other fields. Its
mere conjecture is rescued from the pejorative, recast as the pleasurable reverie of the
thinking mind engaged in nascent speculation. Released from the stranglehold of
teleological knowledge production, it is possible to discern specific properties or
characteristics within the hypothesis that, in turn, point to certain critical operations at
play within the practice of drawing. (Cocker 2017, p. 98)
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Zumthor spoke in this regard of the drawing as an entity shot through with gaps in which the
imagination can wander. (Zumthor 2014, p. 13) The essentially incomplete, allusive character of
architectural notation actively encourages the mind to wander around in it, to inhabit the drawing in
thought and to postulate hypotheses about the blanks. Some sixty years earlier, Polanyi already
formulated a similar idea, stating that meaning emerged once an author ‘dwells in’ an object,
interiorizes its features and regards it as a world on its own, a conceptual microcosm to be inhabited
and explored. (Polanyi 2009, pp. 17–18) It is through such indwelling that meaning emerges: once
the object is viewed from an internal viewpoint, certain features light up and becomes the carriers of
meaning, inspirations to be explored further, or irritations in need of solution.
The absence of too many particulars focuses the spotlight of attention on what is present or presentin-absence, allowing drawings to develop a ‘vector of abstraction’, or ‘sharp abstract point’, as
Bachelard called it. (Bachelard 2002, p. 26) He speaks of a ‘sharp abstraction’, an abstract quality
that has nothing to do with being vague or undefined. Instead, it is an abstraction that
simultaneously embodies the core of an idea. Even the first sketch is not an arbitrary jumble of loose
elements: it points towards the essence of an idea in a purposively deployed, visual idiom. Likewise,
architectural diagrams possess a clarity that is a direct result of their abstract nature. They filter all
obfuscation out, depicting the bare minimum of an idea in a format that is simplified without being
simple; understandable without being unrefined; yet open and inviting of reflection. The sharp
abstraction is the means through which the essence of an idea can be grasped, however
incompletely. Yet, this first grasp is necessary to set off a process of directed inquiry.
Zumthor emphasizes the necessity of this incompleteness: the drawing or model has to contain
blank spaces in which the imagination can enter. The blanks are the niches for something new to be
created at all, be it through imagining what should be in the blank, or by considering the elements
surrounding it. (Zumthor 2014, p. 13) In this context, he also speaks of the perception as
‘Besitzernehmend’, a term that has no English equivalent, but that can be translated as ‘taking-inpossession’ or along the lines of inhabiting, of moving in. Hence the accurate observation that “each
drawing is made from the inside out, leaving a trail for others to follow from the outside in.” (Moore
2011, p. 35) The signs that make up the drawing draw the observer in, allowing him to wander
around in it, to inhabit the drawing, focusing on different aspects every time a tour is made.
To a degree, the signs of which drawings are made up are not just fixed, rigid inscriptions that can be
read in different ways, but are themselves unchangeable. They can be interpreted through a process
of endless iteration and re-performance, just as the diagrams of UNStudio allow for endless recombination and the emergence of new ideas. However, they are themselves also flexible, or
‘plastic’ in Malabou’s sense, allowing them to be shaped and reshaped by the context in which they
are applied, but nevertheless retaining an immediate expressiveness. (Malabou 2009, pp. 66–68)
Indeed, they have to be – if the lines, points, planes, symbols and coordinates must give rise to
something new, if they are to open up ‘spaces of alterity’ in which different possibilities can be
thought by means of repeating the same methodological gesture.
If ‘repetition’ is a matter of making the same (or nearly same) drawing, then ‘novelty’ is produced by
the space that the signs and their interplay allow. Such signs can be interpreted in different ways,
they focus the attention on different aspects of a design when viewed in various combinations, or
they form parts of different associative chains, allowing one to apprehend the whole by means of its
parts.

4

Notation and its Space

In both its manual and digital forms, drawing shares many characteristics with writing, especially in
its reliance on producing inscriptions or traces. Particularly relevant here is De Certeau’s conception
of notational practices. (De Certeau 1988, pp. 134–135) According to him, such notation takes place
in a blank space (un espace propre) that is as it were an island, isolated from the outside world as
long as it is used for notational practices. The notational character of this space has tangible effects
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on the outside world: what is written or drawn on this plane affects how the outside world is
perceived. This conception of drawing as taking place within a defined space is fully applicable to
manual and digital drawing. The virtual space as well as the paper can be understood as clearly
marked domains in which experimentation takes place. Admittedly, there are differences in terms of
materiality here: drawing on a paper with ink is a clearly different experience than drawing in the
phenomenally reductive space of digital production. The act of drawing (or notating) is an act of
explorative reasoning and extrapolation. What emerges in the blank space is viewed as a world to be
inhabited or as a more abstract representational scheme.
The space for drawing is a space of formalization, a plane where (visual) language and conception
are systematized. ‘The scriptural enterprise transforms or retains within itself what it receives from
the outside and creates internally the instruments for the appropriation of the external space’. (De
Certeau 1988, p. 135) What notational practices create, therefore, are not just outcomes, but also
effective tools and mechanisms for better thinking and designing – ‘the nascent speculation’. If we
apply this thought to architectural design, drawing (both digital and manual) is done to develop the
properties and qualities of an absent, architectural object – and simultaneously the means to
represent it. Thus, architectural drawing creates both the preconditions for representing and
realizing its built results. In both instances, thoughts become matter, either in the form of a
representation or in the form of a built object, with the notational act of drawing functioning as a
bridge between the mental and the material. (Van Den Berghe 2013, p. 667)

Figure 3 A chronological drawing from Van Den Berghe (2013), the VDV-C House (1990), an annotation of a vertical section
- or, a formalization of each step. The drawing overlays different processes that will take place in time, rendering them
explicit in the gesture of formalization

The act of formalization is an important feature of drawing, and possibly one that caused Goodman
to regard architecture as ‘mixed and transitional’. Through formalization, the images that are being
produced enter a graphic format, the characteristics of which we will discuss now.
We could say that – in Krämer’s terms – images in the broad sense possess a degree of ‘operative
visuality’ (operative Bildlichkeit). The question that Krämer raises is what the exact role of images in
our contemporary visual culture is – especially when it comes to generating knowledge. Images are
not just supports that serve to facilitate the process of putting everything in grammatical terms.
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Their existence as visual entities is not reducible to a communicative role. Instead, Krämer raises the
question whether knowledge generation should not move from a ‘grammatology’ focused on
linguistic structures to a ‘diagrammatology’ focused on the visual potentials of images in conjunction
with text. (Krämer 2009) To put it in the terms of this paper: can we move beyond Goodman with
the aid of the theory discussed this far?
Krämer identifies a few features of operative visuality that overlap with the account of De Certeau,
notably its panoramic character. The eye can receive multiple images at the same time. It can catch
the essence of an object literally in a split second, given enough clues and partial representations.
The fact that drawings are two-dimensional (even 3D drawings on a screen) allows one to read a
drawing, and to give it an orientation. Some of its features are in the foreground; others in the
background. Some features occupy the centre; others are peripheral. Still, there is a certain ordering
to its elements – an ordering that surpasses Goodman’s concept of notationality, but shares with it
the emphasis on reading and the ordered form of notation. As drawings are meant to be read and
interpreted, their potential rests in the fact that in them something singular can be seen as
something general. A perspective drawing of a certain building in its context may cause one ‘to think
of a similar one’, or it may set off a chain of associations. There is a close link to an effect that Schön
described as ‘see-as’. (Schön 1983) Designers use drawing not just as a kind of ‘serial problem
solving’ aid (Goldtschmidt 1992) but simultaneously as a medium in which recognition and
rethinking play a constitutive role through graphic inscriptions.
As such, the drawing is not just a stepping stone in a solving process, but a continuous combination
of doing and observing. On this account, Krämer notes that the line as mark is the archetypical act of
defining. The distinction or the line marks an asymmetry: an object is inside or outside the boundary;
it is well defined by its edges or it is open; it contrasts with its environment or disappears in it.
Precisely in this characteristic of the graphic language, Krämer asserts, consists its epistemic
potential. Generation of options and possibilities, thinking about the operational constraints and
visualizing these options are inextricably intertwined, and mutually necessary to arrive at coherent
design proposals at all. (Krämer 2009)

5

Discussion

Summarizing the points discussed above, we can concisely postulate the following assertions:
architectural drawing is an explicitly notational practice that is nevertheless not reducible to
Goodman’s concept of notationality, although it is similar in some respects. Yet, it is inextricably
bound to the act of inscribing, of notating, although the inscription itself plays a very different role
than in Goodman’s theory. The signs that are inscribed are themselves open-ended and subject to
change. They can be interpreted in different ways, opening up the new possibilities, taking on
different roles in different contexts. Therefore, the act of repetitive representation in the context of
a directed design process creates a series of objects composed of different layers of meaning.
This richness of meaning allows designers to inhabit or ‘dwell inside’ their objects. Yet, this
immersive exercise takes place in a space of formalization, allowing the designer to imbue creative
and allusive ideas with a sense of rationality and rigorousness. (Zumthor 2014, pp. 30–33) The
formalization is a double one: the drawing is a material trace of the thought, giving it a fixed point in
the physical world, and it simultaneously imbues the drawn object with tangible properties like size,
material or shape. With drawing, the idea moves from the mental to the discursive – from
something that is grasped by the mind to something that can be grasped in natural language.
Taking this into account, we may state that the rigidity of Goodman’s account seems to stem from
the fact that architectural images are to a degree pictorial: they can depict life-like the object that is
being designed. Yet, they are not necessarily to be read as denoting such an object in the same way
that a painting resembles an existing building. Unlike a work of art, the value of architectural
notation resides primarily in its abstractive quality, the so-called ‘sharp abstraction’. In that respect,
architectural images often resemble maps rather than blueprints, as argued by Miller:
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By depicting certain properties as highly isomorphic while other details are omitted or
stylized, map designers affirm the importance of certain kinds of information and
relationships while downplaying other details. It is vital to the success of a map that it be
isomorphic in the properties most vital to a map’s intended usage. (Miller 2017, p. 6)
Like every effective representation, the tension between what is depicted and what is omitted
determines the room for interpretation. Architectural representations are indeed shot through with
perceptual gaps and holes that can be filled by the imagination. Yet, the notational character of
sections, plans, perspectives and elevations stems from the fact that there is a tangible and
productive tension between what is determined by unambiguous symbols and more evocative,
allusive elements of drawings. On one hand, Goodman’s idea that symbols allow for the
reproduction of a work is to some degree true. On the other hand, architectural drawings are not
merely reducible to such elements.
Concluding, and drawing the lines of thought together, architectural design can be seen as
continuous, critical performance that utilizes notation, but is not reducible to it. The resulting
drawings, models, animations – and eventually buildings and spaces – that emerge from this process
are not reducible to a type/token distinction, but escape the idea of narrow teleological knowledge
production. Goodman’s application of the type/token distinction to architecture does not perform
the explanatory work for which it was invented, because the process that is at work in architectural
design is not reducible to this distinction at all. First, because the fact that drawings are not
composed of notations in a narrow linguistic manner. Second, because the process of architectural
drawing does not run unambiguously from undefined to defined, or from abstract to concrete, or
from conceptual to practical. The absences and blanks in the drawing serve as spaces for exploration
and creative performance. Moreover, the fact that the act of drawing occurs in a space of
formalization in which signs are made frees it from mere production of knowledge. Instead, drawing
becomes a mode of inquiry, a process of grasping disparate elements of an idea, or of developing
certain aspects of it.
Therefore, the notationality at work in architectural design processes is generative in its creative and
critical potential. It is a necessary condition for architectural thinking, the cognitive process that
cannot be thought apart from its artefacts and acts of notation it engenders. The different notations
in an architectural design process jointly form a rich system of allusive, metaphorical and technical
information, a system which possesses ‘operative visuality’. This body of information is too rich to be
grasped completely at once, necessitating repetition and layered evaluation, a careful approach that
pays attention to those aspects individually and in conjunction with one another. The relative
ambiguity of some of the artefacts produced in this process allows the imagination to play a key role
through notational practices.
With the emergence of generative design methods, the question of notationality takes on a new
urgency. Not all architectural drawings are hand sketches in which there is a direct link between
‘doing and observing’. Instead, in many cases the architectural gesture is no longer one of notation
in the strict sense. It is as well the definition of limits and constraints within which the computer can
generate options. The observation and evaluation takes place on a series of generated options, in
which the hand had little role to play. The cognitive link between drawing and seeing is as it were
broken. Yet, the images that result from the computing process have certain notational qualities:
they too consist of symbols, lines, shapes etc. And they too have to possess a degree of operative
visuality. Yet, they seem to affect the mind differently than the hand drawing – and at this point, we
might well conclude that the broader concept of Goodman’s notationality will need further revisions
in the future, if only to better understand the relations between notation, generation and
visualization in the age of digital drawing.
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